Covert action by the CIA and other intelligence services is designed to remain secret. Academics and the public at large therefore to this very day face great difficulties in answering two specific questions: What covert action has the CIA carried out in Europe during its almost 60 years of existence? Did CIA covert action violate human rights in Europe? Some operations, however, have become known and are now in the public research domain. Among them are the clandestine anti-communist stay-behind networks set up by the CIA in case of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. As the details of the operation emerge only gradually some sources suggest that the stay-behind network was linked to terrorist groups, adding further interest to this largely unknown research subject at a time when the so called ‘war on terrorism’ has forced academics to examine present and historical terrorism data once again.

INTRODUCTION: COVERT ACTION IN WESTERN EUROPE

After its creation in 1947 the US foreign intelligence service Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was given the explicit task not only to collect and analyse information from across the world, but also to engage in covert action in foreign countries. Many of these operations carried out by the CIA ever since have violated the national sovereignty of the target country and must therefore be considered as illegal. When the National Security Act was passed, which created both the CIA and the National Security Council (NSC), US lawmakers refrained from explicitly mentioning the words ‘covert action’, but more obscurely gave the CIA the duty to ‘perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct’.1

From its very beginning, the CIA has therefore operated at or across the borderline of legality. CIA deputy director Ray Cline many years later
explained that the inconspicuous little phrase ‘such other functions and duties related to intelligence’ referred to covert action and represented an extremely powerful ‘elastic catch-all clause’ allowing the National Security Council to instruct the CIA to carry out a very broad range of operations in foreign countries. ‘We did not mention them [the covert action operations] by name’, Clark Clifford later reasoned, ‘because we felt it would be injurious to our national interest to advertise the fact that we might engage in such activities’.3

Still today many US citizens are not aware of the fact that some of its clandestine services have engaged in at times illegal covert action across the world for almost 60 years. The details of these operations are only known to a small group of active and former participants, as well as academics and journalists with an interest in this field. In the wake of the Watergate scandal US public interest in covert action rose in the 1970s, with critical debates ensuing on the need and morality of covert action. And with the introduction of the internet in the 1990s a larger global audience has become interested in covert action. ‘Who decides when CIA should participate in covert actions, and why?’ is one of the frequently asked questions (FAQ) on the official CIA homepage. ‘Only the President can direct the CIA to undertake a covert action’, the CIA answers on its homepage.

Such actions usually are recommended by the National Security Council (NSC). Covert actions are considered when the NSC judges that US foreign policy objectives may not be fully realized by normal diplomatic means and when military action is deemed to be too extreme an option. Therefore, the Agency may be directed to conduct a special activity abroad in support of foreign policy where the role of the US Government is neither apparent nor publicly acknowledged.4

Covert action can take many forms, from the financial support of friendly publications to the mounting of significant paramilitary efforts, but it must remain secret at all times. This, obviously, is not possible, and sometimes covert action can be traced back to the CIA and the NSC, whereupon the reputation of US presidents, due to their dominant position within the NSC meetings, can suffer a heavy blow, as experienced by President John F. Kennedy after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961. ‘By covert action operations’, US President Richard Nixon therefore stressed, ‘I mean those activities which, although designed to further official US programs and policies abroad, are so planned and executed that the hand of the US Government is not apparent to unauthorized persons’.5 US Congressman Otis Pike defined covert action as an ‘activity other than
purely information-gathering, which is directed at producing a particular political, economic, or military result.\(^6\)

If illegal covert action can be traced back to the desk of a US President in the White House a threat to the credibility of the presidency can result. In order to limit this threat the President will as a rule apply the ‘plausible denial’ strategy and deny that he had ordered the CIA or other governmental agents to carry out the covert action in question and as a sign of outrage fire lower ranking members of the administration. Some have observed that ‘plausible denial’ can amount to presidential lying, because, to quote the CIA homepage, ‘only the President can direct the CIA to undertake a covert action’. US Congressman Otis Pike insisted after his investigation into covert action that presidents can no longer claim to have been out of the loop: ‘The Pike Committee destroyed the old doctrine of “plausible denial”’.\(^7\) And also William Corson, former US Marine Commander in Vietnam, criticized the ‘plausible denial’ strategy as it leads to ‘an elaborate charade of Presidential non-involvement which, if accepted at face value, suggests that successive Presidents have either been blithering idiots, or not considered important enough to possess the need to know’.\(^8\)

Despite their secrecy, academics have studied and described a number of clandestine operations that the CIA carried out in Latin America, Africa and Asia. They include the military coup d’état against President Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973 and Operation Condor, a covert Latin American military network designed to seize and murder political opponents across state borders.\(^9\) The support of Jonas Savimbi’s União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) in Angola after 1975, and the overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in cooperation with the British MI6 in Iran in 1953, are among many well known examples of CIA covert action.

But what exactly has the CIA been doing in Europe? Still today, almost 60 years after the creation of the US foreign intelligence service, little research exists on this sensitive question. Some have assumed that the transatlantic friendship between the USA and the countries of Western Europe had led to a situation in which the CIA refrained from carrying out dirty tricks in Europe, a speculation which, however, cannot be supported by the evidence.\(^10\)

ITALY 1948

One year after the creation of the CIA in Washington, the United Nations General Assembly in 1948 in New York passed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Ever since a contradiction has existed between CIA covert actions on the one hand, and UN human rights on the other hand, as the former quite regularly and in numerous countries violated the latter.
Human rights, it is well known, had been violated consistently by an almost endless chain of actors from literally all countries of the world long before the CIA was created. This has led some observers to ridicule the concept of human rights, above all because the passing of the resolution in the General Assembly did not end human rights violations.

Others, including prominently Eleanor Roosevelt, have insisted that human rights must never be ridiculed as all human beings depend on them. On 28 September 1948 she came to Paris for a presentation of the human rights principles and declared at the Sorbonne: ‘I have chosen to discuss this issue in Europe because this has been the scene of the greatest historic battles between freedom and tyranny’. With the destruction of the Second World War in vivid memory the late US President’s wife firmly declared: ‘Human rights exist to the degree that they are respected by people in relations with each other and by governments in relations with their citizens’.

As reaffirmed by the UN Declaration of Human Rights people have the right to free and fair elections. ‘The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures’. While it is well known that the Soviet Union, eager to protect its sphere of influence, did not respect this right in Eastern Europe, illustrated dramatically in Czechoslovakia and Berlin in the post-war years, the US also, equally eager to protect its own sphere of influence as agreed in Yalta, manipulated elections.

The first covert action operation ever carried out by the CIA targeted a European country, Italy, and specifically the strong Italian Communist Party. US President Harry Truman, together with all other members of the National Security Council in Washington, feared that in Italy’s first post-war election the communists might win an overwhelming victory. The first numbered document issued by the National Security Council, NSC 1/1 of 14 November 1947, therefore stressed: ‘The Italian Government, ideologically inclined toward Western democracy, is weak and is being subjected to continuous attack by a strong Communist Party’. Thereafter, in one of its first meetings, the newly created National Security Council on 19 December 1947, adopted the top secret directive NSC 4-A which ordered CIA Director Roscoe Hillenkoetter to undertake a broad range of covert activities to prevent a communist victory in the first national post-war Italian election scheduled for 16 April 1948.

Within the CIA Hillenkoetter gave the task to manipulate the Italian election to the CIA covert action department ‘Office of Policy Coordination’ (OPC), headed by Frank Wisner. Targeting liberated Europe with covert action was a highly sensitive strategy, as the NSC members knew. If uncovered, European trust in the USA could be severely damaged. Therefore
the highest standards of secrecy were applied. There were only three copies of NSC 4-A, one of which Hillenkoetter had ‘closely guarded in the Director’s office, where members of his own staff who did not “need to know” could gain no access to it’. A second copy was with George F. Kennan at the State Department.14

Most Italians were unaware that the CIA manipulated the elections in 1948. The Italian Communist Party (PCI), the largest in Western Europe, and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), had united for the elections, forming the Popular Democratic Front (FDP). They competed with the Christian Democratic Party (DCI), which had been newly created after the Second World War with US assistance. Washington decided that of a total of 574 seats in the Italian parliament the majority, at least 288 seats, had to be secured by the CIA-supported DCI. The DCI was strengthened by pumping ten million dollars into its campaign.15 And the communist and socialist coalition was weakened through a smear campaign. The CIA issued ‘anonymous pamphlets which defamed PCI candidate’s sex and personal lives, as well as smearing them with the Fascist and/or anti-Church brush’.16 This tactic of targeting specific seats to give control to the DCI rather than going for a complete sweep ‘was successful in all but two of the two hundred plus seats selected’.17 In the final election the DCI won 307 seats, with 48 per cent of the vote, with the leftist coalition unexpectedly polling only 31 per cent, and thus not even reaching 200 seats.

While not everybody agrees that the CIA was the decisive factor which secured DCI victory, President Truman was so impressed by the CIA’s Italian operation that he saw to it that covert action was institutionalized as an instrument of US statecraft. Only two months after the Italian election, on 18 June 1948, the National Security Council passed directive NSC 10/2 to replace NSC 4-A. While NSC 4-A had authorized the CIA to carry out covert action in Italy only, NSC 10/2 gave the CIA the task to carry out covert action across the world. The document stated that ‘covert operations’ are understood to be:

all activities . . . which are conducted or sponsored by this government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and conducted that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related to: propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition, and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee
liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.\textsuperscript{18}

By creating the CIA and passing NSC 10/2 Truman had unleashed US dirty tricks on a grand scale. ‘During his twenty-year retirement Truman sometimes seemed amazed, even somewhat appalled, at the size and power of the intelligence community he had brought into being’, British historian Christopher Andrew commented.\textsuperscript{19} Retired and fragile, Truman claimed that he had never intended the CIA ‘to operate as an international agency engaged in strange activities’.\textsuperscript{20}

**BLACK SITES 2005**

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the start of the so-called ‘war on terrorism’, CIA covert action in Europe once again made media headlines and became the subject of a highly controversial debate. During this debate the CIA was accused of immoral and illegal operations relating to secret prisons, so-called ‘black sites’, torture, sometimes referred to as ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’, and exported torture, so-called ‘extraordinary renditions’ in which suspects were secretly transferred to third countries that routinely use torture.

European politicians protested strongly. ‘We don’t even need to talk about the fact that it’s totally unacceptable for people here in Europe just to be abducted’, German Interior Minister Otto Schily criticized. He was alluding to the case of Khaled al-Masri, a Lebanese-born 42-year-old German citizen who had been abducted during a CIA covert action operation while on holiday in Macedonia in late 2003. According to his own testimony Masri had then been taken to Afghanistan, where he was drugged and beaten while being held captive in a secret CIA prison. Masri was released when the CIA realized that it had mistaken him for a terrorist, whereupon the US ambassador in Germany offered his apologies to Otto Schily.\textsuperscript{21}

The Universal Declaration stated clearly that ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.\textsuperscript{22} Aware of 500 years of European colonialism and two world wars, many Europeans were critical of the abuse of power under whatever new pretexts. ‘In the war against international terrorism’, Schily stressed, ‘there must be no law-free territories and definitely no torture’.\textsuperscript{23} As debates spread on whether CIA techniques included torture at all, the *Washington Post* opened a new debate and reported that the CIA was operating secret prisons, so-called ‘black sites’ in Asia, Latin America and also Europe.

Public perceptions linked the reports on torture with those on the black sites and concluded that the CIA was an intelligence service which operated
beyond democratic checks and balances and, according to totalitarian nightmares, tortured in remote dark cells. ‘The men from the pages of a bad spy novel throw people they don’t like into secret prisons that officially do not exist, snug little dungeons hidden away in undisclosed countries’, Eugene Robinson commented in The Washington Post, and criticized those ‘American officials whose un-American treatment of prisoners in the war on terrorism has shamed our nation’.24

According to the US media the CIA’s covert detention system has at times established facilities in eight countries, including, among others, Thailand, Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay in Cuba and existed also in Eastern European countries.25 The New York-based non-governmental organization Human Rights Watch presented flight records showing that CIA planes had carried prisoners from Kabul to Polish and Romanian military facilities during covert action operations. CIA planes allegedly also repeatedly landed at airports in Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, and Libya, as well as in Germany, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Macedonia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, and Greece. The Council of Europe sharply criticized such CIA covert action and gave Swiss parliamentarian Dick Marty the challenging task to carry out an official investigation into the CIA black sites in Europe. The press wrote of ‘one man confronts the CIA’, and Marty added: ‘Realistically, I feel like a biker who competes in a race against a Ferrari’.26

‘This agency does not do torture. Torture does not work’, CIA Director Porter Goss, insisted in public interviews. ‘We use lawful capabilities to collect vital information, and we do it in a variety of unique and innovative ways, all of which are legal and none of which are torture’.27 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, on a tour through Europe in the Ukrainian capital of Kiev in December 2005 stressed: ‘As a matter of US policy, the United States’ obligations under the CAT [Convention against Torture], which prohibits, of course, cruel and inhumane and degrading treatment, those obligations extend to U.S. personnel wherever they are, whether they are in the United States or outside of the United States’.28

But many Europeans and Americans were not convinced by CIA Director Goss and Secretary of State Rice. ‘The question remains whether she [Rice] means the same thing by torture as we do’, Karsten Voigt, the German government’s coordinator on German–US relations, explained when large discrepancies emerged between what the EU and the NSC considered to be torture.29 Tom Malinowski, Washington advocacy director of Human Rights Watch, sided with the EU and flatly rejected the claims of both Goss and Rice: ‘It’s public knowledge that the CIA has used “waterboarding”, mock executions, extended sleep deprivations, and other forms of severe
mistreatment of detainees. The Bush administration’s statements that it doesn’t use torture are simply meaningless.\textsuperscript{30}

The CIA interrogation technique known as ‘water boarding’ became the focus of the discussion. On the condition that their names and identities remain secret CIA officers confirmed to the US media that the CIA used water boarding on suspects incarcerated in isolation at secret locations on military bases as one of six ‘Enhanced Interrogation Techniques’ instituted in mid-March 2002 by the NSC. ‘The prisoner is bound to an inclined board, feet raised and head slightly below the feet’, an unnamed CIA source described the technique. ‘Cellophane is wrapped over the prisoner’s face and water is poured over him. Unavoidably, the gag reflex kicks in and a terrifying fear of drowning leads to almost instant pleas to bring the treatment to a halt’.\textsuperscript{31}

While most Europeans insisted that water boarding is torture, CIA officers who spoke to the US media on condition of anonymity were split on the issue. Some insisted that these were ‘harsh techniques’, but not torture, and they were necessary to fight terrorism: ‘There are many who feel these techniques, properly supervised, are both valid and necessary, the sources said’. Other CIA officers disagreed on moral or pragmatic grounds. Some argued that confessions obtained this way are unreliable and provide questionable information aimed at pleasing the interrogators. ‘This is the problem with using the waterboard. They get so desperate that they begin telling you what they think you want to hear’, one source said.\textsuperscript{32}

All questioned CIA officers confirmed that these interrogation techniques are not being carried out by ‘CIA runaway agents’ but follow the chain of command which goes back to the Deputy Director of Operations at CIA headquarters in Langley, who is supported by the Director of Central Intelligence and the National Security Council of the administration of President George Bush Junior. ‘When an interrogator wishes to use a particular technique on a prisoner’, one source said, ‘the policy at the CIA is that each step of the interrogation process must be signed off at the highest level – by the Deputy Director for Operations for the CIA. A cable must be sent and a reply received each time a progressively harsher technique is used’. In one instance an officer caused the death of one detainee at a mud fort dubbed the ‘salt pit’ that is used as a prison in Afghanistan. CIA sources said the death occurred when the prisoner was left to stand naked throughout the harsh night after being doused with cold water. It is ‘bad interrogation. I mean you can get anyone to confess to anything if the torture’s bad enough’, former CIA officer Bob Baer argued.\textsuperscript{33} Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, criticized: ‘Many interrogation techniques authorized for use by the CIA amount to torture. Their authorization by higher-ranking officials is illegal and potentially criminal’.\textsuperscript{34}
Arguably the largest publicly known covert action operation carried out by the CIA in Europe occurred during the Cold War in the western part of the then divided continent. In cooperation with the British foreign intelligence service MI6 the CIA covert action branch set up and ran for 40 years clandestine anti-communist stay-behind armies in the NATO countries Germany, France, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, Denmark and Norway, as well as in the officially neutral countries Sweden, Switzerland, Finland and Austria.\textsuperscript{35}

Former CIA Director William Colby emphasized that the stay-behind operation was ‘a major program’ of the CIA, designed to have top secret armed soldiers in Western Europe ‘ready to be called into action as sabotage and espionage forces when the time came’.\textsuperscript{36} In case of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe the international stay-behind network was designed to fight as a secret NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) guerrilla force behind enemy lines on Soviet-occupied territory. In order to implement the major programme the CIA and the MI6 for many years closely cooperated with European military and civilian intelligence services, including among others SIFAR (Italy), UNA (Switzerland), MIT (Turkey), SGR (Belgium), BVD (Netherlands), BND (Germany), DGSE (France), NIS (Norway), KYP (Greece), and PIDE (Portugal).

The strategic thinking behind the stay-behind networks rested on the experiences of the Second World War and particularly Adolf Hitler’s \textit{Blitzkrieg} which had led to the rapid occupation of large parts of Europe. After the Second World War British and US military strategists feared an invasion and occupation of Western Europe by the Soviet Union, and decided that a secret guerrilla and resistance movement should be set up during peacetime. Within the CIA the covert action department Office of Policy Coordination under Frank Wisner was responsible for setting up the stay-behind network.\textsuperscript{37}

The stay-behind networks remained top secret for decades and were only discovered after the end of the Cold War. The first English book which in the 1990s dealt with the phenomenon appeared in 1995. Entitled \textit{Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions since World War II}, William Blum’s critical history of international CIA operations related that ‘this covert paramilitary network, code-named “Operation Gladio”…established units in every non-communist country in Europe…from an operational point of view, it appears that the CIA and other intelligence services were calling the shots’.\textsuperscript{38}

Blum based his story in parts on the revelations of former CIA operatives, including Philip Agee, who had joined the CIA in 1957, served in Latin
America and other countries, but left the agency in 1969 on moral grounds. In his publications Agee revealed the existence of clandestine stay-behind armies, declaring that ‘paramilitary groups, directed by CIA officers, operated in the Sixties throughout Europe’. In some countries, according to Agee, the secret armies were directed against a potential internal enemy:

The Greek-American CIA officer recruited several groups of Greek citizens for what the CIA called, ‘a nucleus for rallying a citizen army against the threat of a leftist coup’. Each of the several groups was trained and equipped to act as an autonomous guerrilla unit, capable of mobilizing and carrying on guerrilla warfare with minimal or no outside direction. The members of each such group were trained by the CIA in military procedures. The weapons were stored in several places.39

Agee deliberately revealed names and top secret operations in his publications in order to destabilize and weaken the CIA. This infuriated the CIA, and the agency chased him through numerous countries. Today Agee, who is a strong supporter of Fidel Castro, lives in Havana.

When in 1996 secret CIA arms caches belonging to the stay-behind network were discovered in neutral Austria, Chancellor Franz Vranitzky angrily insisted that he knew absolutely nothing of a secret army and together with Austrian President Thomas Klestil demanded that the United States launched a full-scale investigation into the violation of Austria’s ‘permanent neutrality’.40 Yet while Swanee Hunt, US ambassador to Austria, offered her apologies, CIA sources familiar with the stay-behind covert action operation claimed that the Austrian government had been well informed of operation stay-behind. ‘The entire Austrian government from Chancellor Leopold Figel [in office from 1945 to 1953] onwards knew of these arms caches and the whole operation’, Richard Helms, director of the CIA from 1966 to 1973, declared. ‘What the Americans have done here was highly welcome to the Austrian government. The government was not only informed of the arms caches but also...of the stay-behind operation’.41 And at the State Department in Washington Nicholas Burns added: ‘The aim was noble, the aim was correct, to try to help Austria if it was under occupation. What went wrong is that successive Washington administrations simply decided not to talk to the Austrian government about it’.42

According to Italian sources familiar with Gladio (the code name given by the CIA to the Italian stay-behind network), the CIA used the secret soldiers also in the total absence of a Soviet invasion to influence European politics through covert action operations. General Gerardo Serravalle, commander of the Italian stay-behind within the Italian military intelligence service from
1971 to 1974, recalled how one day the CIA, which supplied all secret soldiers across Western Europe with cash, guns and explosives, had stopped sending money and weapons for his Gladio unit. Serravalle was angry and called for a meeting with the chief of the CIA station in Italy, Howard Stone, on the clandestine Gladio training centre Saboteur’s Training Camp (Centro Adestramento Guastatori, CAG) in Sardinia on 15 December 1972. Serravalle recalled the meeting as follows:

I realized that the CIA interests, as represented by these officials, weren’t really concerned with the level we had reached in training but rather with the subject of internal control. That is, our level of readiness to counter street disturbances, handling nation-wide strikes and above all any eventual rise of the Communist Party.\footnote{43}

Serravalle got a very clear impression of what the CIA and the US government wanted: ‘Mr. Stone stated, quite clearly, that the financial support of the CIA was wholly dependent on our willingness to put into action, to programme and plan these other – shall we call them – internal measures’.\footnote{44} Greatly disturbed members of the Italian parliament investigated the secret CIA army in the 1990s and came to the sensitive conclusion that members of the CIA network had linked up with Italian right-wing extremists in covert action and had supported them in a top secret campaign which included terrorist attacks against civilians which were wrongly blamed on the Italian communists in order to discredit them at the polls. When Stanfield Turner, CIA director from 1977 to 1981, was questioned on this dark side of the stay-behind operation in an interview in December 1990, Turner angrily ripped off his microphone and shouted: ‘I said, no questions about Gladio!’\footnote{45}

The European network of clandestine stay-behind networks was coordinated by NATO. For in case of an invasion of Western Europe it would have been NATO’s task to coordinate military manoeuvres and re-establish European independence. Within NATO two clandestine committees, the so-called ‘Clandestine Planning Committee’ (CPC), and the ‘Allied Clandestine Committee’ (ACC), both linked to NATO’s SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) met regularly on the level of officers from the various European military intelligence services in order to discuss questions related to stay-behind and secret warfare.

Both the CIA and US Special Forces took part in the secret NATO meetings of ACC and CPC, according to Serravalle: ‘At the stay-behind meetings representatives of the CIA were always present. They had no voting right and were from the CIA headquarters of the capital in which the meeting took place. . . . Or members of the US Forces Europe Command were present, also without voting right’.\footnote{46}
Thomas Polgar, who had retired in 1981 after a 30-year-long career in the CIA, explained with an implicit reference to CPC and ACC that the stay-behind programmes were coordinated by ‘a sort of unconventional warfare planning group linked to NATO’. In these two clandestine planning groups senior officers of the CIA, MI6 and NATO regularly meet with senior officers of European intelligence services, at times represented by the director of the intelligence service as ‘each national service did it with varying degrees of intensity’. According to Polgar the ACC and CPC representatives ‘would meet every couple of months in different capitals’, adding that ‘in Italy in the 1970s some of the people went a little bit beyond the charter that NATO had put down’.47

While NATO refused to publicly provide details on the stay-behind operation, an unnamed NATO official reasoned that the delicacy of the stay-behind data should not be overlooked by international researchers, stressing that in Germany the CIA had recruited Nazis into the stay-behind in order to guarantee an anti-communist conviction. The CIA, according to this unnamed NATO source, ‘incorporated lock, stock and barrel the espionage outfit run by Hitler’s spy chief Reinhard Gehlen. This is well known, because Gehlen was the spiritual father of Stay Behind in Germany and his role was known to the West German leader, Konrad Adenauer, from the outset’.48 When German politicians learned of this they spoke of a ‘Ku-Klux-Klan’ and asked for a detailed investigation. ‘The affair is a case for the national public prosecutor’, German parliamentarian Hermann Scheer declared, ‘because the existence of an armed military secret organization outside all governmental or parliamentary control, is incompatible with the constitutional legality, and therefore must be prosecuted according to the criminal law’.49 Yet when Scheer was informed that also his party, the Social Democrats (SPD), had been involved with the operation during its time in government, the SPD decided to refrain from investigating CIA covert actions in Europe.

In almost all countries national parliaments remained ignorant of the existence of the secret networks throughout the Cold War. This led some parliamentarians to conclude that the stay-behind networks were illegal and incompatible with national constitutions as they operated beyond checks and balances and with virtually no democratic oversight. The EU parliament therefore passed a resolution on the stay-behind networks on 22 November 1990, sharply criticizing NATO and the US intelligence services for having set up military structures in Europe which for decades operated beyond democratic control. And in Belgium, Italy and Switzerland parliamentary investigations led to the demobilization of the respective secret networks.

In France the socialist government of President Francois Mitterrand in late 1990 claimed that no secret stay-behind army linked to the CIA existed on
French soil. Yet he was contradicted by Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti who publicly confirmed that all governments of Western Europe were involved in the stay-behind affair. Andreotti let the press know that far from having been closed down long ago, representatives of the French secret army had also taken part in the secret ACC meeting in Brussels as recently as 24 October 1990, causing considerable embarrassment in France.

‘There were probably a lot of Frenchmen who wanted to be ready if something happened’, retired CIA officer Edward Barnes reasoned. Barnes had served in France as a CIA liaison officer to the French stay-behind during the French Fourth Republic and had left the country in 1956. Resisting a Soviet occupation was the primary purpose of the stay-behind network as Barnes confirmed, while promoting anti-communist political activity in France ‘might have been a secondary consideration’.50

According to Admiral Pierre Lacoste, who directed the French foreign intelligence service, DGSE, from 1982 to 1985 under President Mitterrand, ‘a limited number of people’ from the French stay-behind network were involved in ‘terrorist actions’ against de Gaulle and his Algerian peace plan in the early 1960s. Lacoste insisted, however, that the Algerian anti-de Gaulle operations had been the only case when the French secret soldiers had become operational inside France and stressed that he believed that Soviet contingency plans for invasion nevertheless justified the stay-behind programme also during his time in office.51

Italian Senators of the Democratic Left Party (Partito Democratico della Sinistra, PDS), which had replaced the Italian Communist Party after the collapse of the Soviet Union, under the chairmanship of Senator Giovanni Pellegrini, looked at the data in more detail, heard witnesses, saw documents, and presented a 326-page report in June 2000.52 The former Communists came to the conclusion that – apart from preparing for a Soviet invasion – the secret Gladio army had, together with the CIA, the Italian military intelligence service, and selected Italian right-wing terrorists, fought the Italian Communists and the Italian Socialists for fear that the latter would betray NATO ‘from within’. ‘Those massacres, those bombs, those military actions had been organized or promoted or supported by men inside Italian state institutions and, as has been discovered more recently, by men linked to the structures of United States intelligence’.53

When British historian Trevor Barnes approached the delicate research field of CIA covert action in Europe he confessed in 1985 that one still knows very little, adding that some data was available on CIA covert operations in France. ‘The CIA, according to a former agent, bribed at least one regular member of the French cabinets in the decade’, Barnes reported, but cautiously added that this is ‘only the tip of a covert action iceberg which
will slowly be uncovered'. If the data found by the Italian researchers is correct and the CIA supported terrorism in Western Europe, then indeed the covert action iceberg is much bigger than even Barnes might have imagined.

While some in Italy questioned the independence of former communists and their allegations that CIA covert action in Europe had included the support of terrorism, others had more trust in members of the Italian intelligence community who also went on record with claims that CIA covert action in Europe included the sponsoring of terrorism. In March 2001, General Giandelio Maletti, the former head of Italian counter-intelligence, had to testify on the Piazza Fontana case. Shortly before Christmas 1969, four bombs had exploded in public places in Rome and Milan, killing 16 and maiming and wounding 80, most of them on the Piazza Fontana in Milan. After the massacre, the Italian intelligence service had planted bomb parts in the villa of well-known leftist editor Giangiacomo Feltrinelli in order to place the blame on the Communists and the extreme left.

‘The CIA, following the directives of its government, wanted to create an Italian nationalism capable of halting what it saw as a slide to the left, and, for this purpose, it may have made use of right-wing terrorism’. Maletti testified in the Piazza Fontana trial. ‘The impression was that the Americans would do anything to stop Italy from sliding to the left’, the 79-year-old General explained, and added: ‘Don’t forget that Nixon was in charge and Nixon was a strange man, a very intelligent politician, but a man of rather unorthodox initiatives’.

The stay-behind networks in Western Europe remain to this day amongst the most polarizing CIA covert action operations. ‘Prudent Precaution or Source of Terror?’, the international press hence wisely asked upon the discovery of the network in 1990. Most observers, including the author, agree that assisting resistance groups in Soviet-occupied Europe would have been a ‘noble task’, to use the words of State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns. While on the other hand the sponsoring of terrorism in whatever form and against whatever target is clearly unacceptable and would represent the darkest possible form of CIA human rights violations in Europe.

It is crucial to note that the evidence for the two interpretations of this CIA covert action operation cannot be accessed in the same manner. The prudent precaution data, hence the post-invasion resistance task, is accessible and confirmed beyond any doubt. But the specifics of the terror data are much more difficult to unravel and therefore contribute to an ongoing agitated debate. Academics like the author who venture into this uncharted territory must rely on newspaper reports which at times attempt to be sensational in order to gain market shares, books of former participants who give their
personal twist to the story, parliamentary reports, and juridical testimonies. Still today only a very limited amount of written governmental documents on stay-behind are publicly available. ‘The information superhighway is barely a macadam path when it comes to throwing light on the truth of the Gladio networks’, John Prados of the National Security Archive in Washington correctly observed.58

Other scholars, including Olav Riste of the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, are highly sceptical of the ‘torrent of allegations about Gladio’s involvement in coup plans and various terrorist attacks’. Riste, who agrees with Prados that ‘documentary evidence is extremely difficult to come by’ in the field of international stay-behind research, claims that most books and articles on the subject are ‘products of muckraking journalists with a conspiratorial bent, or “revelations” by disgruntled officers with axes to grind’. Yet by first classifying all journalists who worked on Gladio as ‘muckraking’, and secondly discrediting all intelligence officers who spoke out on Gladio and terrorism in front of judges and parliamentarian commissions in various countries as ‘disgruntled’, Riste discards without further investigation some of the most important sources in this delicate research field. It does not add strength to Riste’s argument that, based on his valuable research on the Norwegian stay-behind, he implicitly upholds the claim that stay-behind networks were never involved in terrorism in any country of Western Europe, while admitting at the same time that he did not look at the other countries and that sources are scare.59

On the other side of what is now an animated international Gladio debate among scholars and observers, the stay-behind networks have been compared to the Al Qaeda terrorist organization, despite the fact that, first, we still do not know the full story of either ‘Al Qaeda’ or ‘Gladio’, and second the comparison of two enigmatic historical phenomenon is risky, to say the least. ‘The army of saboteurs’ operated ‘without meaningful oversight, and many with a visceral hatred for anything Left-wing’, notes Phil Chamberlain in the British Tribune. ‘So, it was small wonder that Gladio operatives decided not to wait for any invasion, but put their irregular warfare skills to the test. The result was a litany of atrocities across the continent which Al Qaeda has come nowhere near matching’.60

Philip Davies of the Brunel University Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies in England acknowledges that

these networks became something of a public scandal and row in Europe when it was discovered that in Italy in particular, members of the stay-behind system had been involved in atrocities committed by the military and security service during the 1970s intended to disrupt
the political left by committing acts of terror attributed to the militant extreme left of the period.

Davies insists, however, that ‘few of these [networks] had quite the same bloody post-recruitment track record of the Italians’ and therefore criticizes that the current author’s book ‘consistently tries to portray the operation as an attempt by NATO and the United States to manipulate the politics and harass, disrupt or even murder members of the political left’. Yet then Davies concludes that ‘Paramilitary groups have a history of going rogue’ and the ‘lesson is: once you have trained and armed anyone they are difficult to disarm and impossible to untrain, and you can never completely control what they do with either in the long run’, a wise observation which surely does not apply to Italy only, as for instance the data on Turkey, Spain, Portugal and Greece suggests.61

‘In this age of global concern with terrorism it is especially upsetting to discover that Western Europe and the United States collaborated in creating networks that took up terrorism. In the United States such nations are called ‘state sponsors’ and are the object of hostility and sanction’, John Prados highlighted the far-reaching implications of the Gladio debate. ‘Can it be that the United States itself, Britain, France, Italy and others should be on the list of state sponsors? The Gladio story needs to be told completely so as to establish the truth in this matter’.62

The US government strongly disagreed. When the networks were first discovered in 1990 the administration of George Bush senior refused to comment, while an unnamed ‘US government official familiar with Operation Gladio’ claimed that Gladio was ‘solely an Italian operation. We have no control over it whatsoever’, adding, that ‘If there are allegations that the CIA was involved in terrorist activities in Italy, they are absolute nonsense’.63

More than 15 years after the discovery of the networks in Europe the administration of George Bush junior, finally, felt a need to take a stand on the ongoing international Gladio debate. On 20 January 2006 the State Department of Condoleezza Rice rejected the claim that the stay-behind networks were linked to terrorism in Europe. The State Department issued a statement on the internet in which it wrongly claimed that these claims were based only on the US Field Manual FM 30-31B, which instructs US agents to carry out false flag terrorism but which the State Department termed a Soviet forgery. It is a ‘false notion that West European ‘‘stay-behind’’ networks engaged in terrorism, allegedly at US instigation’ the State Department insisted. ‘This is not true, and those researching the ‘‘stay behind’’ networks need to be more discriminating in evaluating the trustworthiness of their source material’. 64
The ‘source material’ in question is the Field Manual 30-31B, one passage of which reads:

There may be times when HC [Host Country] governments show passivity or indecision in the face of Communist or Communist-inspired subversion, and react with inadequate vigor to intelligence estimates transmitted by U.S. agencies. Such situations are particularly likely to arise when the insurgency seeks to achieve tactical advantage by temporarily refraining from violence, thus lulling HC authorities into a state of false security. In such cases, U.S. Army intelligence must have the means of launching special operations which will convince the HC governments and public opinion of the reality of the insurgent danger and of the necessity of counteraction.

Then FM 30-31B goes on to suggest that US agents infiltrate the enemy and carry out ‘violent actions’, presumably including terrorism, in the name of the enemy.

To this end, U.S. Army intelligence should seek to penetrate the insurgency by means of agents on special assignment, with the task of forming special action groups among the more radical elements of the insurgency. When the kind of situation envisaged above arises, these groups, acting under U.S. Army intelligence control, should be used to launch violent or non-violent actions according to the nature of the case . . . In cases where the infiltration of such agents into the insurgent leadership has not been effectively implemented, it may help towards the achievement of the above ends to utilize ultra-leftist organizations.

In the 1980s FM 30-31B was presented as a genuine US document to the Italian public by the Italian Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into the US-linked secret Masonic Lodge Propaganda Due (P2), headed by Licio Gelli. Gelli declared, ‘The CIA gave it to me’. FM 30-31B is dated 18 March 1970, Headquarters of the US Army, Washington DC, and signed by General Westmoreland. William Westmoreland commanded American military operations in the Vietnam War from 1964 to 1968 and thereafter served as US Army Chief of Staff from 1968 to 1972. He died in the summer of 2005 and is no longer available to testify whether Annex B is a Soviet forgery as the State Department claims, or whether it is a genuine US document which he signed. Documentary film-maker Allan Francovich asked Ray Cline, CIA Deputy Director from 1962 to 1966, whether FM 30-31B was an authentic document or a Soviet forgery, and the latter responded on the BBC: ‘Well, I suspect it is an authentic document. I don’t doubt it. I never
saw it but it’s the kind of special forces military operations that are described. On the other hand you gotta recall, that the defence department and the President don’t initiate any of those orders, until there is an appropriate occasion’.67

It is somewhat contradictory that the US administration urges academics with an interest in covert action to investigate historical documents more carefully, while at the same time it is limiting access to crucial documents. The National Security Archive (NSA) at George Washington University in the USA tried to shed some light on Operation Gladio and in 1991 filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Yet the CIA refused to reveal any stay-behind documents. Nine years later the author placed a FOIA request with the CIA, whereupon the CIA raised FOIA exemptions B1 and B3 relating to top secret operations and replied that ‘The CIA can neither confirm nor deny the existence or non-existence of records responsive to your request’.68

The author appealed this decision of the CIA and argued that ‘The documents that were withheld must be disclosed under the FOIA, because the secrecy exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) can only reasonably refer to CIA operations which are still secret today’. Arguing that this was no longer the case the author concluded: ‘If you, Mrs. Dyer, raise FOIA secrecy exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) in this context, you unwisely deprive the CIA from its voice and the possibility to take a stand in a Gladio disclosure discourse, which will take place regardless whether the CIA decides to participate or not’.69 In February 2001 the CIA replied that ‘Your appeal has been accepted and arrangements will be made for its consideration by the appropriate members of the Agency Release Panel. You will be advised of the determinations made’. The CIA stressed that the Agency Release Panel deals with appeals ‘on a first-received, first-out basis’, and that the process could take some time as at ‘the present time, our workload consists of approximately 315 appeals’.70 More than five years later the author has still not had a reply.

CONCLUSION

Research into CIA covert action and human rights violations in Europe remains a challenging task for academics, as the evidence available is limited, morally sensitive and at times contradictory. This is true also of the stay-behind operation, which is particularly sensitive as elements of the network were not only a valuable ‘safety net’ ready to be activated in case of a Soviet invasion, but seem to have engaged in criminal activities including terrorism.

When the stay-behind networks were discovered in 1990 the press observed that the ‘story seems straight from the pages of a political thriller’71 and argued that this large international covert action programme represented
‘the best-kept, and most damaging, political-military secret since World War II’.72 Beyond such sensational journalism the hard facts were, however, much more difficult to come by. Also 15 years later it remains unclear when or whether the full story on the CIA stay-behind operations in Western Europe will be available for a larger public.

After the end of the Cold War a remarkably large percentage of European citizens became highly sceptical about the moral integrity of the United States and its foreign policy. ‘The interventions of the US government in world affairs, often vigorously opposed within the United States, uniformly have been either cynical, or brutal or both’, claimed for instance British Professor Michael Dummett.73 This disillusion, which grew during the presidency of George Bush junior, neglects the fact that not all members of past and present US administration are cynical, and that indeed many, including members of the CIA and other US intelligence services, went to work with a moral focus: to confront the totalitarian Soviet Union and fight for human rights during the Cold War, or to confront terrorism in the twenty-first century.

Yet while focusing on human rights as an end, a glorious goal, the means employed to reach the end were brutal, justified by reference to the equally or more brutal tactics of the totalitarian Soviet Union during the Cold War, or by reference to the brutality of the different terrorist networks in the twenty-first century. By employing all means, regardless of their immorality and brutality, US foreign policy increasingly resembled the policies of its enemies. The Gladio data suggests that the US, like its enemies, engaged in terrorism, while Guantanamo, black sites and other special US prisons deprive prisoners of basic rights and in this respect share features of the Soviet Gulag system. ‘After all, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism’, George Kennan had wisely warned in 1946 in his famous ‘Long Telegram’ on the Soviet Union, ‘is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping’.74

NOTES

CIA. The Pike Report, with an introduction by Philip Agee (Nottingham: Spokesman Books 1977) p.17. A month after the Pike Committee was handed to Congressman Pike alleged in the US House of Representatives on 9 March 1976 that threats were made against him by the CIA’s Special Counsel for legal affairs, Mitchell Rogovin. Allegedly Rogovin had said to Searle Field, staff director of the House Select Committee on Intelligence headed by Pike: ‘Pike will pay for this [investigation and report], you wait and see . . . We will destroy him for this. I’m serious’. Rogovin denied having made such threats. See ibid. p.7.


Patrice Mc Sherry, Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield 2005).


Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only (note 3) p.171.


Corson, Armies of Ignorance (note 8) p.299. As the operation was secret the money was dirty and had to be laundered first. Corson explains that this was done by first withdrawing 10 million dollars in cash from the Economic Stabilization Fund, laundering it through individual bank accounts and from there ‘donate’ it a variety of CIA front organizations.

Ibid. p.298.

Ibid.


Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only (note 3) p.198.

Ibid.


Crossland, ‘CIA Flights’ (note 21).


29 Crossland, ‘CIA flights’ (note 21).


32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.


37 Ibid. p.81.


42 The Sunday Times, 28 January 1996.

43 General Serravalle testimony in front of Frankovich’s camera. Serravalle speaks Italian, the English translation is by the film company (subtitles). See Allan Francovich, Gladio: The Puppeteers. Second of total three Francovich Gladio documentaries, broadcast on BBC2 on 17 June 1992.

44 Ibid.

45 The Independent, 1 December 1990.

46 Ibid. p.79.


51 Ibid.

52 Senato della Repubblica. Commissione parlamentare d’inchiesta sul terrorismo in Italia e sulle cause della mancata individuazione dei responsabilily delle stragi: Stragi e terrorismo in Italia dal dopoguerra al 1974, Relazione del Gruppo Democratici di Sinistra l’Ulivo, Rome, June 2000. The eight members were: Valter Bielli, Atonio Attili, Michele Cappella,
Piero Ruzzante, Alessandro Pardini, Raffaele Bertoni, Graziano Cioni, Angelo Staniscia. Translated by the author from the Italian original.


57 International news service Reuters Western Europe, 15 November 1990.

58 Foreword by John Prados in Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies (note 35).


60 Phil Chamberlain, ‘Al Qaida has got Nothing on this Terror and Mayhem’, review of Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, Tribune, 9 September 2005.


62 Foreword of John Prados in Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies (note 35).

63 The Washington Post, 14 November 1990. The only other article by The Washington Post which features the keyword ‘Gladio’ appeared on 8 August 1993, again solely on Italy. This, compared to 39 articles on Gladio in the same time period in the British newspaper The Guardian, might be taken as an indicator of how badly the Gladio phenomenon was covered in the US press.


66 Allan Francovich, Gladio Part III. The Footsoldiers, Observer Film Company, 50 minutes (shown on BBC2, 24 June 1992).

67 Ibid.


69 Letter dated 23 January 2001 of the author to Mrs. Dyer at the CIA.

70 Letter dated 7 February 2001 from the CIA’s Information and Privacy Coordinator Kathryn I. Dyer to the author.

71 The Times, 19 November 1990.

72 The Observer, 18 November 1990.
